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THE PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION

The Campaign For Child Survival: Twelve Lessons

By J. Doble & C. Koopman

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6 East 39th Street, New York, New York 10016 212·686·6610

THE CAMPAIGN FOR CHILD SURVIVAL:
TWELVE LESSONS OR INSIGHTS THAT MAY BE HELPFUL TO FUTURE EFFORTS

An analysis prepared for the Evaluation Committee
of the Campaign for Child Survival and the Carnegie Corporation

by
John Doble and Cheryl Koopman
The Public Agenda Foundation
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INTRODUCTION

This report presents a series of observations and insights derived from an evaluation of the Campaign for Child Survival (CCS) by the Public Agenda Foundation. The CCS was a twenty-two month effort to raise Americans' awareness of international infant mortality, and support for private and national efforts to reduce it. The CCS was spearheaded by the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, with initial funding provided by the Carnegie Corporation.

About the Campaign for Child Survival: The CCS was administered by a national director and staff hired specifically for that purpose who worked within the organizational structure of the U.S. Committee for UNICEF; the campaign's effort was concentrated on both the national level and on "model" campaigns in five cities: Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia. In each city, the CCS was run by a local campaign director who was also hired specifically for the campaign and who worked in the local office of the U.S. Committee for UNICEF. The national office assumed overall responsibility for bringing

national attention to the issue, coordinating the local efforts, facilitating communication and cooperation among the local campaigns, and evaluating the effectiveness of the effort. However, the administration of the CCS was largely decentralized; local offices, reporting to the U.S. Committee regional directors, had considerable day-to-day autonomy for planning and administering the effort in their city.

Initial plans for the CCS involved national collaboration among a number of nonprofit agencies working on development education issues. It was hoped that CARE, Save the Children, and the International Red Cross among other organizations would work in concert on this effort with the U.S. Committee, pooling their resources and expertise to maximize the effort's impact and effectiveness.

The Role of the Public Agenda Foundation: The Public Agenda Foundation, a nonpartisan research and educational organization, was asked by the Carnegie Corporation to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the CCS. In addition to extensive public opinion research experience at gauging Americans' understanding about some of the most complex issues facing the country, the Public Agenda has administered a dozen city-wide, citizen education efforts on issues such as the public schools, the rising cost of health care, and the nuclear arms race and U.S.-Soviet relations. Drawing on its experience with educational efforts and its considerable research expertise, the Public Agenda worked with the campaign's national director and with the U.S. Committee Board's Evaluation Committee in an on-going fashion from the beginning of the CCS

to evaluate its impact in the broadest sense. The Public Agenda's role included assessing people's reactions to the idea of reducing international infant mortality through GOBI (an acronym for the four-part strategy of Growth-monitoring, Oral rehydration, Breastfeeding, and Immunization), testing the effectiveness of campaign materials and brochures, advising the campaign's director about planning and strategy, and conducting a before-and-after campaign survey of community leaders' attitudes toward this issue in the five model cities. The survey of leadership following the completion of CCS (reported in the companion volume to this report, The Campaign for Child Survival: Community Leaders' Attitudes) suggests that the campaign significantly increased leadership awareness of the problem of international infant mortality, and led to dramatically increased leadership support for both government and private efforts to reduce it. Moreover, this research suggests that a broader campaign with more communications resources would lead to even greater awareness among community opinion leaders.

This report is designed to assist the U.S. Committee, through its Evaluations Committee, and the Carnegie Corporation in their assessment of the CCS. In this report, conclusions are derived from two sources: first, the Public Agenda's experience as evaluators of the effort; second, from an analysis of ten in-depth interviews conducted at the conclusion of the effort with CCS and U.S. Committee for UNICEF staff members in which staff reflected on their experiences. Respondents included the five campaign coordinators for the model city campaigns, and five regional directors of the U.S. Committee for UNICEF in the effort's five model cities. The interviews lasted an average of about two hours

each, and focused on what respondents saw as the campaign's achievements and difficulties. To increase candor, respondents were assured that their remarks would be totally confidential. Therefore, in this report, comments are not attributed to particular individuals; rather, in most cases, respondents are identified only as a "staff member."

The conclusions reached in this report are the sole responsibility of the Public Agenda Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CCS Evaluations Committee, the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, or the Carnegie Corporation. We should also stress that while the Public Agenda's involvement was considerable, our vantage point was limited, and we do not intend that this report be considered a comprehensive statement about the entire campaign or its administration. Rather, it is our hope and intention that certain insights or lessons were learned during the course of conducting this effort that will prove useful to both the U.S Committee and the Carnegie Corporation and, perhaps more important, to other organizations and institutions that undertake similar efforts in the future.

1. Setting unrealistic goals or expectations for an effort can undermine staff motivation and morale, and lead those involved with an effort to discount just how much has been accomplished.

The difficulty of setting realistic expectations: Those involved with the CCS had very high hopes for the effort and what it would achieve. Initially, those involved with the effort talked about changing public opinion so dramatically that people would ask their Representatives to provide more development assistance, or about using infant mortality as a kind of wedge to interest Americans in the broader issues related to developing countries.

It is understandable why unrealistic expectations about an effort like the CCS may develop. The problem of Third World infant mortality is so vast that anything less than a radical solution seems inadequate. This issue is especially tragic because thousands of lives could be saved rather easily. However, given that the vast majority of Americans are unaware of the issue and offer only grudging support for government-provided development assistance, the attitudes of millions of Americans would have to change radically in order to affect public policy. It would, for example, require a wholesale shift in public thinking to get the American people to call for increased government support for efforts to reduce infant mortality.

The resources necessary to change public opinion so dramatically would be enormous -- perhaps hundreds of times what was available for this effort. In view of the level of public support for foreign aid or development assistance, it should have been apparent that the CCS could never hope to revolutionize Americans' thinking about the issue. Given the public's starting point, it should have been clear that while the CCS could have an effect on people's thinking, the impact would be incremental; the campaign could not possibly have changed people's thinking to the extent that it led the public to suddenly care about a wide variety of development-related issues or demand an increase in U.S. development assistance.

However, while a sober assessment is easy for an outsider, those who devote themselves to an effort may find it hard to become enthusiastic about a campaign that will, at best, achieve only incremental change. Therefore, awareness of what was realistic did not always permeate some of the most important aspects of the campaign's planning and evaluation. One staff member said "Our expectation was to create a drastic change in awareness. But our expectations were too high. You can't change attitudes overnight. You change them over generations. We have to be prepared to do education for the next 20 years." In effect, the wish for fundamental change fathered a belief that the effort would have more impact than was possible, given the resources available and the reality of what it takes to change the thinking of millions of Americans.

When "unrealistic" expectations are not met, significant accomplishments can be discounted: When very high expectations are not met, those involved in an effort can lose sight of exactly how much has been achieved. (For example, it is no small success to have a representative of the CCS appear on the Today show and talk about GOBI for five minutes. And this was only one of many such accomplishments of the effort. As noted in the Public Agenda's report on community leaders' attitudes, the CCS had a significant impact on leadership thinking about the issue in each of the campaign's five model cities.) Finally, when accomplishments are discounted, the effect on staff morale can be devastating. "There was an overwhelming feeling of disappointment among the people working with this campaign," one staff member said. "The feeling was we didn't accomplish anything."

In Sum: Keeping in mind realistic expectations about what is possible to achieve is essential in evaluating and executing an effort like the Campaign for Child Survival, and key in terms of staff morale. One way to overcome unrealistic expectations might be for efforts to set a series of interim goals or "markers" by which they can gauge their effectiveness as the effort takes place. One example that comes to mind is the United Way "thermometer" which measures how near the goal that campaign is at any given day. A device like this helps establish achievable goals to begin with and also helps those involved with an effort monitors their progress against realistic expectations as the effort unfolds.

2. Setting "education" as the primary goal of an effort like the Campaign for Child Survival can handicap the work because a basic impulse of many people may be to do something to solve the problem directly.

The primary goal of the CCS was to increase awareness of the silent emergency of Third World infant mortality. For a variety of reasons, the effort was interpreted to be solely an educational effort and not an effort to raise money to combat infant mortality or to aid organizations working on this issue. Rather, the aim was to raise consciousness about Third World infant mortality, and, ideally, use that issue as a wedge to increase public interest in development-related issues generally. While this goal, along with many others, was at least partly achieved, setting education as the primary goal created certain handicaps for the effort since this goal disregarded a basic impulse of the audience.

The difficulty of developing a clear message: Setting public education as a goal made it difficult for the CCS to develop a clear message about what people should do after they learned about Third World infant mortality. The issue was presented to the public as an emergency, albeit a silent one. People were told that many thousands of children were dying each day from causes that were readily preventable. Implicit in any discussion of an emergency is the idea that immediate steps should be taken to end it. Yet people were not told how they personally could do anything to alleviate suffering or reduce the dimensions of the tragedy.

Campaign staff often found it hard to interest people in or motivate them to help with an effort that was not directly working to reduce infant mortality in developing countries. One staff member commented, "People say to me, 'What good is an education effort? Why should I tell others? I want to help save lives!'" Another staff member said, "People need to know they can do something [to reduce infant mortality]." A third person said the effort's goal was roughly analagous to taking someone to the scene of a very bad automobile accident and then, when the person asks what he can do to help the victims, telling him, "Quick, go tell a whole lot of other people [about the accident]."

The difficulty in gaining leadership support: Setting education as the primary goal of the effort also led staff members to believe (whether correctly or not) that they could not ask for financial support under any circumstances, and that they therefore had a difficult assignment in gaining the support of leadership segments such as business groups and service organizations. One staff member said, "We had a goal to conduct outreach with business groups. But I didn't know what to ask a corporate chief executive officer to do. I couldn't ask a CEO to raise money, I couldn't even ask him for five dollars for child immunization. All I could tell him to do was educate his employees [about child survival]." Staff members also said that some service organizations found it hard to understand how raising public awareness would coincide with their mission to provide a community service and serve mankind.

Confusion about fundraising: Setting education as the goal also led to staff confusion about how to respond to people whose preferred form of assistance was a donation. One staff member said, "People wanted to give us money, and we were nearly at the point of turning them away, telling them to donate elsewhere." In addition to the confusion, such uncertainty meant that local efforts had less funds to accomplish their goal of education than they might have had contributions been more acceptable.

In sum: Setting education as the goal of an effort like the Campaign for Child Survival created confusion for staff and for those reached by the effort, especially because the issue was presented to them as an "emergency." Unlike other issues that have been subjects for a citizen education effort (such as, for example, welfare reform, the public schools, or the nuclear arms race) Third World infant mortality is an issue that people, acting as individuals, can do something about it. The power of the individual to help in a small but tangible way is, for example, why so many Americans support Save the Children. And people who learned about the CCS often wanted to help in just such a way. At the very least then, in order to minimize confusion, future public outreach and education efforts should anticipate, understand and plan for the possibility that people may want to take direct action to help solve the problem.

3. The difficulties of getting independent organizations to collaborate on a public education effort are enormous and were not fully anticipated.

Great effort was exerted to make the CCS a collaborative effort by the U.S. Committee for UNICEF that would involve CARE, Save the Children, the Red Cross and other prominent national organizations involved in development assistance/education. A successful collaboration, it was felt, would increase the staff, expertise, and support available for the national effort. Given that reducing Third World infant mortality was a priority for each organization, it seemed reasonable to hope that collaboration would be possible. However, the intended collaboration never materialized and for some, this was a great disappointment. One staff member said, "My biggest disappointment with the campaign is that national collaboration never happened."

The constraints facing other organizations: Those involved with the CCS probably underestimated the difficulty of getting independent organizations to work together. Like all nonprofit organizations, those that were targeted for collaboration have their own priorities, their own institutional needs, and (probably) rather severe limits in terms of resources, staff, etc. To redirect their energies and focus on a new issue such as child survival within a collaborative framework would have required that they shift resources away from on-going activities that were also important. And so the institutional difficulties facing

organizations that were asked to re-order their priorities to work together on the Campaign for Child Survival were probably underestimated.

The perception of a limited pool of support for development assistance: Each of the organizations targeted to collaborate depends on contributions for its existence. Since these organizations all have a similar purpose, senior personnel in these organizations may have felt that funds donated to one organization were likely to come from money that would otherwise have gone to another. That is, there seemed to be a belief that the organizations are in competition, that the pool of public support for development assistance is limited, and that any resources going to the CCS would be at the expense of another on-going program or organizations.

In fact, evidence suggests that the contrary is the case. The Public Agenda's research for the CCS suggests that infant mortality may have been nearly an ideal issue to increase the pool of public support or donor-base for development-related issues for all organizations; given the appeal of this issue to people from all parts of the country and political orientation (described in our first report for the project), child survival might have increased the level of support for all the organizations involved in development assistance had they collaborated on the CCS.

While those involved with the CCS may have underestimated the difficulty

of getting independent organizations to work together, they did not disregard the problem. Indeed, these difficulties were one reason for setting education as the campaign's goal. Education, it was felt, was an area in which all the organizations could cooperate to their mutual benefit. But one staff member said, "The degree to which these organizations are competitive was underestimated. They are very suspicious about statements that fundraising is not the goal [of an effort like the CCS]." The organizations also had questions about the motives of the U.S. Committee. "They wanted to know," one staff member said, "why UNICEF would initiate the campaign unless it expected to benefit -- which, they felt, would be at their own organization's expense."

The administrative structure may have given organizations pause: The special role that the U.S. Committee for UNICEF played in the CCS was another factor that may have inhibited collaboration. One staff member said, "The campaign is housed in the [U.S. Committee for] UNICEF office, the campaign coordinator has a contract with and is paid by UNICEF, and reports to the UNICEF regional director. Therefore, UNICEF was seen as sponsoring and initiating the CCS at the community level." And so, after much negotiation and discussion, it gradually became apparent that it would be impossible to make the CCS a truly collaborative effort.

Local collaboration was impossible without national coordination: In the design of the campaign, it was assumed that collaboration at the national

level would support parallel collaborative efforts at the city campaign level. But once it became clear that there would not be national coordination, local collaboration proved to be impossible. One staffer said, "It's difficult [to get organizations to work together] when collaboration has to start at the local level." Another added, "National support is essential for organizing the representatives of local groups. Because the national effort at collaboration failed, the support of the national organizations never trickled down to us at the local level."

In sum: The failure of the collaboration model may have been a great missed opportunity for all the organizations working on development education. The evidence suggests that all these organizations could have benefitted -- perhaps enormously -- from collaborating on an effective national effort to raise Americans awareness of international infant mortality. However, the difficulties of getting independent organizations to work together were almost certainly underestimated. While collaboration among independent organizations may be a desirable goal, considerable planning and great pains will be needed to make collaboration a reality in any future efforts.

4. Locating a campaign such as the CCS within an existing organization such as the U.S. Committee for UNICEF can cause institutional tensions.

The campaign was seen as additional work: The CCS was administered within the local offices of the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, an arrangement that led to certain tensions. Campaign staff members complained that the CCS was not a high priority for UNICEF regulars. To members of the regular UNICEF staff, they said, the CCS was merely additional work for an already overloaded organization. One campaign staff member said, "The U.S. Committee for UNICEF makes extraordinary demands on its regular staff. Given what they had to do already, the campaign did not get the highest priority [in the local UNICEF office among the regular staff]." Another campaign staff member said, "The U.S. Committee for UNICEF didn't support the child survival campaign. To them, the campaign was just a pain because they [the regular UNICEF staff] was already overextended."

The campaign was in competition for limited resources: The CCS also had to compete for office space, equipment and supplies with the on-going U.S. Committee for UNICEF activities. One campaign staff member said, "I got my office moved around several times because I was seen as a burden. [The CCS] took up space in an already crowded office. When I needed to use the Xerox machine, I was low man on the totem pole. I was told, 'This is not meant personally, but our [regular UNICEF] projects are more important [than the CCS].'"

The campaign was seen as a financial drain: Tensions may have been exacerbated because of a belief that the CCS was a financial drain on the U.S. Committee. One staff member said, "The Committee sunk something like a half million dollars in addition to the Carnegie money into the campaign. And, because this is not a fundraising effort, UNICEF can never get that money back."

The status of the campaign coordinator: The relationship between the campaign and the other activities of the U.S. Committee may have been symbolized by the status of the campaign coordinators. Coordinators were hired as consultants, without organizational benefits such as vacation, retirement, sick leave, and health insurance. One staff member said that the coordinators held a kind of "fringe" status and complained that CCS coordinators were expected to work on UNICEF activities that had no relationship to what they had been hired to do. One staff member said, "The campaign coordinator had to participate in National UNICEF Day and other [regular UNICEF] activities. Whenever there was a special [regular UNICEF] event, the coordinator was pulled off the Campaign for Child Survival to work on it."

In Sum: The tensions that can be created when a temporary effort is administered within an existing organization are considerable. Unless organization regulars enthusiastically share the view that a temporary effort is vital to the organization's overall mission, the effort's effectiveness may be severely handicapped by such an arrangement.

5. Reporting procedures designed to measure the impact of an effort can generate inaccurate statistics and also create morale problems.

Campaign staff felt that there was definite value in having reporting procedures to measure the impact of their work. However, several said the methods used (such as tallying newspaper clippings, the number of speaking engagements and requests, the number of requests for showing the campaign film, etc.) were inadequate in several respects; and some comments suggest that the procedures may have affected morale.

The categories used to evaluate the effort were not clearly defined: Local campaign staff sometimes felt that the quantitative methods and categories used to measure the campaign's accomplishments generated misleading information. Staff were asked to tally outreach activities (such as requests for brochures or the campaign's film) on a regular, monthly basis and report the totals to the national office. "But people [in different cities] completed the forms differently," one staff member said. "There was not a standard for how to count contacts. You could count the mailing of fifty information kits to a business group as fifty mailings or as a single mailing. And if one person called five times, was that one contact or five?" As a result, this person implied, the CCS national director and the effort's Evaluation Committee could rather easily be led to draw inaccurate conclusions about the level of activity in a particular model city.

Evaluating an effort whose impact may be subtle and long-term: It is especially difficult to measure the effectiveness of an effort with a goal as broad as this one. For one thing, the main impact may well be subtle and long-term. One staff member said, "It's difficult to measure the impact of the Campaign for Child Survival on children who will grow up and, as adults, contribute to UNICEF in the future."

One way to document this type of impact is to develop measures of intermediate effect. In the case of the CCS, a survey of community leaders was conducted both before and after the campaign. The survey was based on the assumption that the impact of the effort is likely to be clearest among elites, and that such impact will "trickle down" from leadership to other segments of the community. As shown in the Public Agenda's report on the leadership survey, the impact of the Child Survival Campaign on leadership awareness in the five model cities was significant.

In Sum: Procedures used to evaluate an effort such as the CCS should be designed carefully to take into account accuracy and the potential effect on staff morale. Those working on this effort welcomed the idea of being evaluated, in part because it made them feel as if what they were doing was important. And so we would recommend that on-going evaluation be part of any future effort; however, the methods used should be designed with the possible negative effects in mind.

6. It is difficult to foresee the level of interest an effort will generate among different leadership segments in a community and easy to misunderstand the motivation of those who may get involved in an effort.

Campaign staff members were responsible for targeting community segments to which to direct their outreach activities. While targeting was often done with help from a steering committee, some staff members said they misjudged the responsiveness of particular segments, either overestimating or underestimating the level of response.

Over- and underestimating interest: Campaign staff sometimes misjudged the support that could be obtained from the business community. In one city, initial efforts were directed toward leaders of the largest corporations in town. But one staff member said, "I was surprised we couldn't get more involvement from the huge corporations, especially those that are in the food (i.e., nutrition) business."

However, staff sometimes learned that businesses with international ties were more supportive of the effort, even if that firm's local operations were relatively small. Such business leaders were more likely to be aware of Third World issues, and may have felt that getting involved with child survival would help them generate favorable publicity overseas. In a similar vein, one staff member said that the responsiveness of health professionals from community hospitals had been overestimated; however,

the interest of members of an international health care professional association was considerable and had been initially underestimated.

Response may depend on timing: The responsiveness of certain organizations may depend on the timing of the outreach attempt. For example, campaign staff sometimes underestimated how willingly service organizations such as the Rotary Club would assist the campaign. In practice, they discovered that when outreach directed to such organizations was well-timed and coincided with the conclusion of other projects, there was significant willingness among such groups to take up the issue of Third World infant mortality and make it their own.

In Sum: There are many factors and considerations that determine whether an organization or leadership segment will support an effort like the CCS. And while it is difficult, if not impossible, to take all of them into account before an effort begins, advance planning efforts should try to identify and target groups that might be most interested in an effort.

7. The effectiveness of materials can be increased at little cost.

An effort's materials are based on assumptions about what will be effective with the target audience: Efforts like the CCS rely on materials such as brochures and films to communicate with the public about the effort's basic message. The development of such materials is inevitably based on certain assumptions about the target audience. Such assumptions include which message to emphasize, which terms need to be defined and which ones are already understood, which graphics will be most effective with the target audience, and so forth. Often such assumptions involve the level of knowledge people have about the issue, the attitudes they hold, their level of interest in the issue, and the kinds of messages that will encourage them to give the effort serious attention.

It is easy and comparatively inexpensive to "market test" the effectiveness of materials: In most public education efforts administered by nonprofit agencies, materials are developed without systematically testing their effectiveness; but a professional assessment of people's likely reactions can be quick and comparatively easy to complete. Such an assessment can be crucial because campaign materials are expensive to produce and their effectiveness is often critical to the effort's success.

The Public Agenda tested materials for the CCS. To gauge the impact of a brochure, we conducted two focus groups in two cities. A memo was prepared detailing what people understood, what they found confusing, and summarizing the piece's strengths and weaknesses in terms of its ability to communicate effectively with typical citizens. Reacting to that memo, the CCS campaign director and staff incorporated the findings and prepared a new brochure that was much more likely to accomplish its mission of communicating clearly and effectively about the campaign.

In sum: It is comparatively easy and inexpensive to use focus groups or depth interviews to "market test" people's reactions to an effort's materials, brochures, films, posters, slogans, etc. Such "market testing" can lead to revisions that can significantly enhance the desired effectiveness of such materials.

8. A decentralized effort has particular strengths and weaknesses.

Tailoring the campaign to its setting: The CCS operated in a decentralized fashion, with the model city campaign staffs having considerable autonomy. This structure led to a number of notable accomplishments. Because of its decentralized nature, the campaign could take advantage of local opportunities. One staff member said, "Each city has different assets: L.A. has show business, Atlanta has the Carter Center, and so forth. Houston would not be appropriate for a legislation campaign but Austin would have been. Letting each city tailor its effort was a good idea."

One campaign activity that took advantage of local assets was in the Twin Cities where the Kiwanis organized a function with the Minnesota North Stars Hockey Team and a fast food chain. GOBI buttons with child survival information were attached to coupons for a free hamburger and distributed to spectators at the hockey game whenever the North Stars reached certain goals.

The local campaign staffs shared information with each other: The local staffs felt that the campaign benefitted from sharing work developed by the local efforts, especially the educational curriculum developed in Atlanta, the public service announcements with Robert Guillaume, Vincent Price and Barbara Jordan that were made in Houston, the poster and poetry

contest organized in Philadelphia, and the religious observance weekend kit designed in Los Angeles.

The local campaigns revised each other's creations: The local campaigns not only shared ideas and resources, they also refined each another's creations which, staff members felt, made them more applicable to their own city. For example, the Atlanta child survival curriculum and the Los Angeles religious observance weekend kit were revised by staff in other model cities for use in those cities.

Decentralization resulted in an additional city taking on the effort: One staff member said, "Seattle wanted to be a model city, but wasn't selected. Yet it did an excellent campaign with little resources. It probably succeeded because the campaign was autonomous."

On the other hand, decentralization may lead to less coordination, less systematic planning, and reduced efficiency: The decentralized model made it more likely that city campaigns would begin without a specific plan for outreach. One staff member said, "My 'goals and objectives' weren't set until eight months after I started. The national office never asked for this." Another staff member said, "It was up to us

locally to choose community segments to which to direct our outreach efforts. From day one there should've been a two-year plan of action. We should have had a calendar for each city."

The lack of a systematic plan made it difficult to ensure that campaign materials were available when needed. One staff member said, "The [campaign] film arrived too late to be used in my city's launching of the effort." Another staff member said, "When I needed brochures or campaign letterhead it seemed as if they always seemed to arrive late."

In sum: The decision to administer an effort in a decentralized fashion has a number of advantages. However, certain problems may almost be inevitable; to minimize their influence, they must be considered and planned for ahead of time.

9. Trying to involve specialists (such as media professionals or public relations firms) can lead staff members to postpone generating publicity themselves and instead wait until the "pros" arrive.

Efforts like the CCS seemingly have everything to gain and nothing to lose by trying to enlist specialists such as a public relations firm to work on a pro bono basis and generate publicity. But involving such professionals can have a counterproductive effect in ways that are not easy to anticipate.

Undermining staff motivation: The expectation that prominent public relations professionals will generate publicity may reduce staff members' motivation to generate publicity on their own. Instead of doing all they possibly could, some CCS staff members put off working in this area, and rationalized their decision by saying they were waiting for the public relations firm to come on board. In effect, staff often seemed as if they were "Waiting for Godot." One of them said, "We originally planned to be followers rather than leaders in developing publicity for the campaign. We expected national news coverage to happen without our help. At some point we shifted gears drastically to become leaders. We realized that we had to go out and aggressively seek media contacts on our own." Another said the campaign staff made more progress in generating publicity when they realized that they had to do it themselves rather than to wait for a prominent firm working through the national office.

The belief that a high-powered media and public relations specialist will publicize a campaign can also lead to very high expectations. One staff member said, "I thought the national office would take the lead in ensuring that there was major national advertising, with big national events and major publicity. I thought there might be a national religious ceremony, a huge event with major media coverage. The impression was that there would be a huge media campaign orchestrated from the national level and supporting publicity at my city level with billboards, a message on a GoodYear blimp, and a float carrying a message in a parade." When such expectations are not met, they can impair morale in the most serious way.

In Sum: The potential involvement of nationally prominent public relations firms may cause staff to sit back and wait for the "pros" to generate publicity even though a considerable amount of success could be achieved through their own efforts. And even if a professional public relations firm does get involved in an effort, its contribution will almost certainly be less than was dreamed of by some staff members. Therefore, future efforts should anticipate that staff may both consider the involvement of a professional firm to be a substitute for their own efforts and may overestimate what a professional firm can realistically be expected to do. Professionals are not and should not be considered substitutes for staff efforts.

10. While prominent representatives can increase an effort's effectiveness, the work required to use such people effectively is easy to underestimated.

Working with VIPs takes a lot of time: It is easy to underestimate how time-consuming it is to effectively use help from nationally prominent VIPs. In the CCS, some staff members had high hopes about what campaign spokesmen would do or would be able to do. One of them said, "At the beginning, I thought Lee Iacocca and Presidents Carter and Ford would telephone their friends and get them to support the campaign in the five cities. But of course this didn't happen." Staff members were then disappointed when they realized what the actual level of such people's help would be.

It is also easy to underestimate how much staff time and effort is required to effectively work with and utilize such people. For example, if a former president agreed to visit a city on behalf of the effort, the work required to plan for and publicize his visit would be enormous. TV and film stars and other VIPs who volunteer their time and efforts all need considerable staff support.

Enlisting the help of prominent persons: It is also easy to underestimate how much time is required to recruit prominent individuals to help in an effort. One staff member said that efforts to recruit a

VIP proceeded "down to the wire" [because of uncertainties about the person's schedule], thus leaving insufficient time to publicize the event.

The kind of help to request: The time of VIPs is their most precious resource. And so, one staff member said, when recruiting such persons to help, tasks should be designed for them that do not require much of their time. That person said, "My city's Blue Ribbon Advisory Council met only once. And that was an important selling point for me in recruiting them; I knew their time was valuable and so I didn't ask for much of it. The Blue Ribbon Council members helped us generate publicity for an event. But I could only ask them for very specific things: to contact a few individuals, or to make a public presentation, or to sign a letter."

In Sum: Enlisting the help of VIPs can greatly enhance an effort's effectiveness. But the staff time and effort required to recruit and effectively use the time of VIPs can hardly be overestimated.

11. The time required to use volunteers productively is considerable.

It takes time to recruit volunteers: Local campaign staff members found that recruiting volunteers required a lot of work: giving presentations to groups and asking for help, doing mass mailings to people who might be interested, talking to people who had been volunteers for another UNICEF project, and doing follow-up phone calls with those expressing interest in the effort. One staff member said, "I spent lots of time simply recruiting volunteers and interviewing them to see what they wanted to do and what skills they had that could be useful in the campaign."

It takes time to plan volunteer activities: An effort that uses volunteers productively must come up with activities that volunteers can complete. But what seems obvious may be difficult, given the limited time and skills that volunteers often have. One staff member said, "You need projects for volunteers to do. But we did not do enough planning or thinking about volunteer activities." The person suggested it was important to have a list of activities from which volunteers could choose so that they would not get bored. Another staff member raised questions about volunteers' skills, saying "We could suggest tasks -- for example, that volunteers do a survey in their neighborhood to see how many children under five haven't gotten immunized against major childhood illnesses. But work like that requires certain skills that the volunteers may not have."

Working within organizational constraints: Volunteer activities have to be considered within the constraints of the organization's resources. Some campaigns were housed in minimal space, with little furniture, perhaps in a small room with a desk, chair and telephone. Planning how to use volunteers must take into account questions such as where they will work, the equipment they need, etc.

Training and supervision: Training or explanation of a task to the volunteer is required. Then staff must supervise volunteers to ensure that the task gets completed in a timely and satisfying fashion. Supervision can also entail providing feedback to acknowledge the volunteers contribution by, for example, organizing a reception to honor them. In the CCS, volunteer-related activities consumed a large portion of local campaign staff time.

In Sum: The payoff of using volunteers is not always immediate. While volunteer help can be a great asset, the time and effort needed to use volunteers effectively should not be underestimated.

12. The nearly two-year length of the Campaign for Child Survival led to a lack of focus.

A long effort has advantages and drawbacks: One advantage of a long-running effort is that its momentum can snowball, with support building as people hear about it. Some of the major accomplishments of the CCS (including the the religious curriculum for Houston churches, the school curriculum for Atlanta elementary schools, School Awareness Week in Minneapolis, and the Children Express Hearings in LA and Philadelphia) occurred many months after the effort had begun. A long effort also gives staff more time to learn from their experience. "We floundered a lot in the beginning," one staffer said.

But an effort such as the CCS that lasts for nearly two years tends to lack focus or identity as a special, intensive effort. One staff member said, "This [the CCS] didn't even feel like a campaign. When I think of a campaign, it has a beginning, middle and end, and a sense of what is expected. This [the CCS] had none of that."

It is also hard to develop a great deal of emotional intensity with a long-running effort. The CCS did not feel like a campaign, a staff member said, because it did not have a "sense of urgency" about it. In a short campaign, it is comparatively easy to get people to make extraordinary efforts since the campaign (and thus the period of

sacrifice) will be for a limited period of time. But with the CCS, it was hard to get staff to become involved with that level of emotional intensity because the effort was an on-going one. Additionally, it is almost certainly harder to interest the news media to cover a "campaign" that lasts for nearly two years than it is to get them to focus on something lasting a few weeks. Finally, in a long-running campaign, staff turnover (and all the complications that such turnover will lead to) is far more likely.

In Sum: The decision to run the CCS over twenty-two months made it difficult for the effort to develop a clear focus and a level of intensity normally associated with a "campaign." In addition, and especially in combination with its decentralized nature, the effort's length often made it seem as if little were happening when, in fact (as shown in our report on community leaders' attitudes), a good deal of work leading to rather dramatic change in leadership thinking was taking place.

METHODOLOGY

This report is based on the Public Agenda's involvement with the CCS from its beginning, and the results of ten interviews with staff members who were intimately involved with the Campaign for Child Survival. Respondents included the five coordinators of the CCS model city campaigns (in Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia), and the five directors of the U.S. Committee for UNICEF regional offices in the five model cities.

In conducting the interviews, respondents were promised that their confidentiality would be protected. Therefore, in this report, respondents are referred to without reference to city, gender or position.

The interviews were conducted by telephone by Dr. Cheryl Koopman in November and December, 1987. The initial interviews lasted about two hours each, and some follow-up interviewing was also done. The questionning was open-ended, and designed to let respondents describe their feelings in the broadest possible way. The results from these interviews were carefully analyzed before this report was written. While some of the respondents' quotes were edited for grammar and clarity (and to preserve anonymity), extreme care was taken to keep the original meaning intact.

ABOUT THE PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION

The Public Agenda is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research and education organization that specializes in public understanding of complex policy issues. Founded over a decade ago by public opinion analyst Daniel Yankelovich and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Public Agenda's indepth research probes beneath public opinion -- people's top-of-the-head reactions to issues -- to uncover public judgment -- people's views on issues when they have confronted them realistically and weighed the choices and tradeoffs they present. Public Agenda citizen education materials provide average Americans with imaginative and compelling means to understand complex issues for themselves. The organization has conducted research and prepared educational materials on a variety of public policy issues including nuclear arms and U.S./Soviet relations, rising health care costs, Social Security and retirement, social welfare reform, prison overcrowding, and the federal budget deficit.

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CHILDREN:

Childcare and Working Parents: Executive Summary (1983). John Immerwahr, Judith Golub, and Harvey Lauer. An examination of changing economic realities for married couples and single parents, including analysis of national survey data and indepth interviews with both childcare experts and working parents. Part of the multi-year project on jobs and work, "Jobs in the 1980's and 1990's". 22pp. Price: $5.00.

Community Leaders' Attitudes About Child Survival (1987). John Doble and Judith Kallick. Prepared for the U.S. Committee for UNICEF and the Carnegie Corporation. The report contains findings of a survey conducted with over 1,000 community leaders in five cities to assess their views about third world infant mortality. 57pp. Price: $10.00.

Children at Risk, Families at Risk: The Public's Perspective on Child Abuse and Neglect (December, 1987). John Immerwahr and John Doble. Report on public misperceptions about foster care based on series on ten focus groups conducted across the country. Prepared for the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation.

Infant Mortality in the Third World: The Public's Reactions to Child Survival (1986). John Doble. A report for the U.S. Committee for UNICEF analyzing obstacles blocking citizens' consideration of ways to reduce infant mortality in developing countries, with recommendations for the Child Survival Campaign of UNICEF. 46pp. Price: $8.00.

CRIME AND CORRECTIONS:

Crime and Corrections: A Review of Public Opinion Data Since 1975 (1986). Mary Komarnicki and John Doble. Findings, detailed observations and tables of surveys from many sources organized into six sections detailing people's attitudes towards the criminal justice system, police, courts and prison system, and the causes and problems of crime. Prepared for the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. 131pp. Price: $18.00.

Crime and Punishment: The Public's View (1986). John Doble. Prepared for the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. A qualitative analysis of ten focus group discussions exploring people's opinions on crime and corrections, the rationale for their views, and their views on alternatives to incarceration as a means to reduce prison overcrowding. 85pp. Available from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, 250 Park Avenue, New York, NY, 10017 (212) 986-7050.

EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:

SchoolVote: A Public Choice Campaign (1985). An information kit describing a citizen information campaign of issues facing the public schools conducted by Public Agenda with local media sponsors in 1985 in the greater Philadelphia area and in 1987 in Milwaukee. Contains press releases, storyboards, and sample materials from the campaign. Provides information on media participation, community and leadership involvement, and results of culminating SchoolVote "balloting." Price: $2.00.

SchoolVote Ballot Results (1985). Results of balloting from pilot SchoolVote campaign conducted in Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley in 1985 where 100,000 citizens "cast a vote" on choices regarding critical education issues including class size, teacher evaluation, and enriched programs for preschoolers. Price: $8.00.

ENGINEERING, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY:

Engineering and Technology: The Public's Perspective (1986). John Doble and Mary Komarnicki. A qualitative analysis of focus group discussions on the public's attitudes about engineers and engineering. Prepared for the National Academy of Engineering. 46pp. Price: $8.00.

Public Attitudes Toward Engineering and Technology (1986). Mary Komarnicki and John Doble. An analysis of existing opinion survey data on engineering and technology with detailed observations, tables, and survey questions and responses. Prepared for the National Academy of Engineering. 106pp. Price: $20.00.

Science Policy Priorities and the Public (1983). John Doble. A pilot study assessing the public's willingness and ability to participate in setting priorities for scientific research. Prepared in association with Harvard University for the National Science Foundation. 88pp. Price: $12.00.

HEALTH CARE COSTS:

Curbing Health Care Costs: The Public's Prescription (1983). John Doble, Jean Johnson, and Jeff Tuchman. Report on pilot citizen education campaign on rising health care costs -- HealthVote 82 -- conducted in Des Moines, Iowa. Contains data about public understanding of health costs before and after the information campaign and describes the communications activities that led to increased public knowledge of the issue. 80pp. Price: $6.50.

HealthVote: A Public Information Campaign. An information kit describing a citizen information campaign on rising health care costs conducted by Public Agenda with local media sponsors in cities across the country. Contains press releases, storyboards, and sample materials from the campaign. Provides information on media participation, community and leadership involvement, and results of culminating "balloting." in the cities. Price: $2.00.

HealthVote Ballot Results (1985). Detailed results of ballots from five HealthVote campaigns conducted in Dayton, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Peoria, and Raleigh in 1985 where citizens were asked to "cast a vote" on critical health care issues including care of low income citizens and the elderly, malpractice, and use of HMOs and similar alternatives. 20pp. Price: $5.00.

JOBS AND PRODUCTIVITY:

Jobs in the 1980's and 1990's: A Sourcebook for Policy Makers (1983). Harvey Lauer. Report of comparative studies conducted in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Japan, and Sweden on workers' attitudes about productivity, unemployment, worker incentives, and job satisfaction. Prepared as part of the "Jobs in the 1980's and 1990's" project. 359pp. Price: $15.00.

Managing for Motivation in a High Discretion Workplace (1983). Daniel Yankelovich. An examination of factors contributing to enhanced productivity, including a list of "dos and don'ts" for stimulating the work ethic. Prepared as part of "Jobs in the 1980's and 1990's" project. 43pp. Price: $5.00

New Technnology in the Workplace: A Quotebook of Opportunities and Options (1985). Mary Komarnicki. Highlights of findings of the "Technology and Human Resource" project, a study designed to explore ways to introduce new technology in the workplace to enhance worker acceptance and productivity. (102pp). Price: $10.00. Summary report available: $5.00.

People and the New Technologies: An Issue for Managers (1983). Franklin Lindsay, Jerome Rubin, and Richard Cohen. Paper presented at the 1983 Wharton/Reliance Symposium on "Removing Obstacles to Economic Growth" discussing interviews with managers and experts conducted for the "Technology and Human Resources" project. 46pp. Price $7.50.

Putting the Work Ethic to Work (1983). Daniel Yankelovich and John Immerwahr. A ground-breaking report on the state of the American work ethic and its relationship to America's economic vitality. Report is based on indepth interviews with 845 working Americans and includes findings from comparative studies conducted in Great Britain, West Germany, Japan, Israel, and Sweden. Published as the culminating report of the "Jobs in the 1980's and 1990's" project. Includes executive summary. 45pp. Price: 20.00. Bulk rates available.

Work in the 1980's and 1990's: A Series of Nine Articles Appearing in Working Woman Magazine (1983). Julia Kagan. Series of articles highlighting findings from the "Jobs in the 1980's and 1990's" project, with special emphasis of views of women in the work place. Focuses on working mothers and child care, job satisfaction and productivity, technology in the workplace, and retirement. 19pp. Price: $5.00.

NUCLEAR ARMS AND U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS:

Nuclear Proliferation: The Public's View (1985). John Doble. Report on Americans' attitudes concerning the spread of nuclear weapons. Prepared for the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies in Washington, DC. 52pp. Price: $8.50.

The Public, the Soviets, and Nuclear Weapons: An Information Kit (1987). Describes the multi-year joint effort of Public Agenda and the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown Univerisity to explore and enhance the public's role in development of the country's long term policies for nuclear arms and U.S./Soviet relations. Includes information about Public Summit '88, a citizen information campaign to be conducted in cooperaton local television and newspapers in four cities in January, 1988. Campaign asks citizens to think about both short-term and long-term options for relations with the Soviets. Single copies available free of charge.

The Public, the Soviets, and Nuclear Weapons: A Perspective from Community Leaders (1987). Report on series of workshops held with community leaders in ten cities examining issues such as deterrence, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the spread of Marxism in the Third World. Conducted for "The Public, The Soviets, and Nuclear Arms," a joint project of the Public Agenda and the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University. 62pp. Price: $10.00.

Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy: A Briefing Book for the 1984 Elections (1984). The Public Agenda Foundation and the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University. Report based on a 1984 indepth study of Americans' views about nuclear arms, the Soviets, arms control, and communism in the Third World, and an analysis of opinion data on these issues since 1945. Outlines areas of consensus and confusion among Americans and contrast public opinion, elite views and existing policy options. 90pp. Price: $6.00. Technical Appendix: $10.00.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE YEAR 2010: AMERICANS LOOK TO THE FUTURE (1988). Final report on a research study of nearly one thousand citizens on the future of U.S.-Soviet relations, conducted jointly by the Public Agenda and Brown University's Center for Foreign Policy Development. 131pp. Price: $10.00. Technical Appendix: Forthcoming. Also available, summary ballot results from Public Summit '88, the joint citizen information campaign of Public Agenda and the Center for Foreign Policy Development, and conducted in cooperation with local television stations and newspapers in four cities across the country. Price: $5.00

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Options for Social Welfare Policy: The Public's Views (1986). John Doble and Keith Melville. Examination of public knowledge and misperceptions about welfare policy based on series of six focus groups. Prepared for the Ford Foundation. 52pp. Price: $6.50.

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REGIONAL STUDIES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The Kanawha Valley: A Report on Public Attitudes Toward Economic Benefits and Environmental Risks (1986). Richard Harwood. A report on the views of residents of Kanawha Valley (Charleston, West Virginia) on chemical production, environmental trade-offs, chemical companies in the Valley and their economic benefits. Prepared for the National Institute for Chemical Studies. 64pp. Price: $10.00

International Competitiveness in the West: The Public's View (1986). Public Agenda Foundation. Report on focus groups conducted in the western states focusing on the region's economic vitality, international competitiveness and protectionism. Prepared for the Western Governors' Association. 34pp. Price: $7.00.

Survey of Attitudes of the Puget Sound Work Force on Economic Growth and the Work Place (1982). Introduction by William D. Ruckelhaus and Brewster C. Denny. Survey of 500 employed reisdents of three Puget Sound counties on work preference, living environment, economic growth, and worker commitment and productivity. Report provides insights into worker morale at small and large corporations and what workers view as important returns on a job. Survey covers "discretionary" worker effort and willingness to accept environmental trade-offs for economic growth. 110pp. Price: $15.00.

Water Efficiency in the West: The Public's View (1986). Public Agenda Foundation. Summary of series of focus groups in the Western states exploring public understanding and perspective on water shortages and allocation. Prepared for the Western Governors' Association. 43pp. Price: $7.50.

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The Federal Budget Crisis: The Public's Response (1983). John Doble and James Shapiro. A discussion of public misperceptions that may be obstacles to addressing the federal budget deficit. The report is based on indepth interviews with citizens in five cities across the country. Prepared for the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. 28pp. Price: $5.00.

Sex on Campus: Sexually Transmitted Disease: Surviving the Epidemic of the 1980s (1987). Keith Melville. A 16-page guide for college students laying out the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases, including A.I.D.S., and presenting questions and answers about prevention and self-protection. Prepared for the College Satellite Network with guidance from the Centers for Disease Control, the American College Health Association, and the American Council on Education. Price: $2.00.

The Speaker and the Listener: A Public Perspective on Freedom of Expression (1980). John Immerwahr, Jean Johnson, and John Doble. Introduction by Daniel Yankelovich. Report on a national opinion survey of Americans' attitudes about freedom of expression, the First Amendment, and the communications media. Outlines differences in perspective between professionals in journalism and the public. 65pp. Price: $25.00. Technical appendix: 212pp. Price: $17.00.

VIDEOTAPES AVAILABLE FROM THE PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION:

What Should We Do in School Today? (1985). A 22-minute documentary presentation asking citizens to think through choices facing the public schools. Examines dilemma about curriculum, teacher pay and evaluation, class size, and enrichment programs for disadvataged children. Produced for the Public Agenda's SchoolVote campaigns by David and Albert Maysles. Beta, VHS, or 3/4" format. Purchase: For more information, please contact Jeff Tuchman at Public Agenda.

What Price Health Care? (1985). A 22-minute documentary presentation asking citizens to confront choices presented by the rising cost of health care. Focuses on incentives for hospitals, doctors, and patients to curb the cost of health care. Honored by the American Film Festival. Produced for the Public Agenda's HealthVote camapigns by Philip Garvin of NORAC, Inc. in 1982. Revised in 1985. Beta, VHS, or 3/4" formats. Purchase: For more information, please contact Jeff Tuchman at Public Agenda.

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